John Curtin: Defining Moments?

Were the publication of John Curtin’s article ‘The Task Ahead’ and the ‘Cable Wars’ defining moments in Australia’s relationship with Great Britain?

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Word Count: 2450
With thanks to Hilary Brettell,

a truly inspirational teacher
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John Curtin is widely regarded as one of Australia’s greatest Prime Ministers. In office from October, 1941, until his death in July, 1945, he led Australia through the darkest days of the Pacific War. Several of his decisions during this period are regarded as defining moments in Australia’s relationship with Britain, particularly his decision to declare war on Japan independently, the publication of an article entitled *The Task Ahead* and his refusal to allow Australian troops to defend Burma rather than Australia. The historical evidence shows, however, that these events did not affect Anglo-Australian relations. Contrary to popular belief, Curtin’s declaration was not the first independent declaration of war by an Australian government, *The Task Ahead* had no effect on Australian foreign policy with even Curtin stating it had been misinterpreted and the ‘Cable Wars’ did not change Curtin’s opinion of Australia’s place within the British Empire. These events did not, and do not, represent a defining moment in the history of Anglo-Australian relations.

On October 7th, 1941, John Curtin was sworn in as Prime Minister of Australia following the collapse of Menzies’ UAP-Country Party\(^1\) coalition government\(^2\). Two months later, Japanese forces attacked British Malaya and bombed Pearl Harbor in Hawaii, crippling a significant part of the United States’ Pacific Fleet. On the 8th of December, Curtin announced that ‘we are at war with Japan...because our vital interests are imperilled... We shall hold this country and keep it as a citadel for the British-speaking race’\(^3\). A day later, on

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\(^1\) The United Australia Party (UAP) was the forerunner to the modern Liberal Party in Australia. It had been in coalition with the Country Party (now known as the National Party of Australia) since 1934.


the 9th, the Governor-General, acting on behalf of the King, issued a formal declaration of war. The fact that Curtin declared war on Japan independently of Britain is sometimes described as a defining moment in Australian history. Contrary to popular belief, however, Australia’s declaration of war against Japan was not the first it had made in its own right. A day before the formal declaration of war with Japan was signed, the Australian government declared war on Finland, Romania and Hungary on the advice of the British Secretary of State for the Dominions, Lord Cranborne. The British government had recommended an independent declaration and offered legal advice on how this could be done. Curtin’s declaration of war also made it clear that Australia as a British nation and he appealed to Australia’s British identity. This echoed the sentiments Robert Menzies had expressed on September 3rd, 1939, when he stated ‘there can be no doubt that where Great Britain stands there stand the people of the entire British world’.

The first weeks of December brought a series of stunning Japanese successes, causing panic as Australians came to believe that they themselves would be threatened. On December 27th, Curtin published an article in The Herald, titled The Task Ahead. In a passage that is popularly regarded as a defining moment, he wrote:

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7 McKeown, D. & Jordan, R., op.cit.
8 Hudson, W.J & Sharp, M.P., op.cit., p. 136
‘...we refuse to accept the dictum that the Pacific struggle must be treated as a
subordinate segment of the general conflict....

‘The Australian Government, therefore, regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one
in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of
the democracies' fighting plan.

‘Without any inhibitions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to
America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United
Kingdom.'

‘We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces...but we know too, that
Australia can go and Britain can still hold on.’

Many historians, such as W.F. Mandle and David Day, hold that this article
represented a turning point in Australia’s relationship with Britain, an idea that has gained
wide acceptance. Day wrote in 2000 that Curtin’s ‘statement has since come to be regarded...
as marking the point at which Australia came of age, breaking free of the historic bonds of
empire to seek salvation with the Americans.' Curtin’s article was not, however, the first
assertion of Australian independence. On the contrary, two days later Curtin stated:

‘There is no part of the Empire more steadfast in loyalty to the British way of living
and British institutions than Australia. Our loyalty to His Majesty the King goes to the
very core of our national life. It is part of our being...’

He also stated in private that close advisor Fred Shedden’s suggestion, ‘without any
lessening of the bonds with the United Kingdom’, would have been preferable to ‘free of

10 Bold present in the original article as published in The Herald
11 Appendix A: Curtin, J., The Task Ahead, Published: The Herald, 27/12/1941, National Library of Australia
13 Curran, J., Curtin’s Empire, Cambridge University Press, Port Melbourne, 2011, p. 11
14 ibid., p. 14
any pangs\textsuperscript{17} and, much later, referred privately to the furore caused by his statement as a ‘misunderstanding’\textsuperscript{18}. As Curtin himself made clear, both in public and in private, this article did not signify a dramatic, definitive change in Australian policy or in its relationship with Britain. Subsequent events also showed that, despite its portrayal as a turning point, the publication of ‘The Task Ahead’ was not a defining moment in Australian history.

The ‘Cable Wars’, fought over the deployment of Australian troops to Burma\textsuperscript{19}, are also popularly regarded as a defining moment in Australia history. The catalyst for the dispute was the fall of Singapore on February 15\textsuperscript{th}, 1942, after a siege lasting fifteen days\textsuperscript{20}. The impregnable ‘Fortress Singapore’ had been the keystone of Australian defence policy since the 1920’s and, with its fall, many in the Australian government believed that Australia’s last defence against a Japanese invasion had been removed\textsuperscript{21}. On the February 17\textsuperscript{th}, two days after the surrender at Singapore, Curtin cabled Churchill to request that the Australian 6\textsuperscript{th} and 7\textsuperscript{th} Divisions in North Africa be returned to Australia to repel a potential Japanese invasion, rather than reinforce Java as the British High Command had originally intended\textsuperscript{22}. Archibald Wavell, the British commander in Java, cabled Churchill, advising that...

\begin{thebibliography}{99}

\bibitem{16} Freudenburg, G., \textit{Churchill and Australia}, Macmillan, Sydney, 2008, p. 343
\bibitem{17} Freudenberg, G., \textit{op.cit.}, p. 343
\bibitem{18} Curran, J., \textit{op.cit.}, p. 108
\bibitem{19} Burma was considered to be of vital strategic importance by the United States and, as a result, by Britain because of the Burma Road used to supply the Nationalist forces in China.
\bibitem{21} Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Winston Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister, Dated 17/1/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.1701
\bibitem{22} Freudenburg, G., \textit{op.cit.}, p. 376

\end{thebibliography}
any reinforcements would come too late to make a difference. He recommended that the Australian troops be sent to Burma, which was under threat, or to Australia.

Late in the evening of February 17th, Richard Casey, the Australian Ambassador to the United States, asked if the diversion of 'two Australian divisions from Middle East...to India or Burma' would be possible. Very early the following morning, Page cabled Curtin, informing him that the Pacific War Council in London had concluded that the 7th Australian Division, already embarked, should be sent to Burma 'until other troops are available from elsewhere', provided the Australian government agreed. He immediately followed this cable with another stating that, since

'...the road for supplies to China must be kept open at all costs...[and] Australian troops...[are] the only body of troops that could possibly get to Burma in time...I stated that I would strongly recommend...that you should concur in this arrangement...'

Stanley Bruce, Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom, also advised Curtin to agree to the proposal.

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23 *ibid.*, p. 376

24 Australian time


26 341. *Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister*, Dated 18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

27 342. *Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister*, Dated 18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

28 344. *Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister*, Dated 18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142
On February 19th, Curtin cabled London to inform Page that the Australian government would almost undoubtedly not consent to the planned diversion. He sent a confirmation on the 20th, irritated by Page’s, and Lord Cranborne’s, attempts to dissuade him and suspicious that Page had not informed the British of the Australian government’s opinion. In response, Churchill, who had not yet appealed directly to Curtin, wrote:

‘I suppose you realise that your leading division...is the only force that can reach Rangoon in time... you said that the evacuation of Singapore would be 'an inexcusable betrayal’... we therefore [put] the 18th Division and other important reinforcements into Singapore... They were lost...

‘Your greatest support in this hour of peril must be drawn from the United States... if you refuse to allow [the diversion]...a very grave effect will be produced upon the President...on whom you are so largely dependent. See especially the inclination of the United States to move major naval forces from Hawaii into the Anzac area.

The cable was a clear attempt to coerce Curtin and the Australian government into agreeing to abide by the British government’s decision. Churchill blatantly stated that a refusal to divert the 7th Division to Burma could result in the withdrawal of American support for

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29 Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, Dated 19/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5088

30 It emerged later that this was indeed the case and that Page repeatedly told the British he would persuade Curtin to reverse his decision.

31 As Curtin pointed out in his response, the timeline of events shows this was not the case and Churchill himself stated later that the Australian government’s cable had no influence on that particular decision.

32 Appendix B: Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 20/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142
Australia, a serious threat considering the perilous position the Australian government believed itself to be in.

Although Churchill had demanded an immediate answer, Curtin did not reply until the 22nd of February, two days after the receipt of Churchill’s ‘strongly worded request’ 33. He reiterated his refusal, arguing that sending Australian troops to Burma would expose them to undue danger and that they were needed in Australia to repel a Japanese invasion 34. At 3:00pm that day, Curtin received a cable from Churchill, informing him:

‘We could not contemplate that you would refuse our request and that of the President of the United States for the diversion...We therefore decided that the convoy should be temporarily diverted... [to Burma. There are]...a few days for the situation to develop and for you to review the position should you wish to do so...’35

Bruce, who saw a copy of the cable in London, was furious that the troops had been diverted in spite of the Australian government’s stated wishes, but counselled restraint, acknowledging that they were on the brink of ‘a crisis in the relations between Australia and the United Kingdom...a first-class row’ 36. Curtin replied, restating his main arguments and demanding the convoy be sent to Australia 37. Churchill backed down 38. A month later, Curtin

33 Appendix C: 357. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Dated 22/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5403
34 ibid.
35 Appendix D: 362 Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 22/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142
36 364. Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 23/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:M100, FEBRUARY 1942
37 366. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Dated 23/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5424
allowed part of the 6th Division to garrison Colombo in Sri Lanka, which, following the loss of Burma, was under threat\(^39\).

The ‘Cable Wars’ were a remarkable episode in Anglo-Australian relations but their importance should not be overstated, particularly since they were not the first time Churchill and an Australian Prime Minister had argued over Australian troop deployments. Throughout the latter half of 1941, Churchill had tried to persuade first Menzies, then Fadden and finally Curtin to allow the 9th Division to remain in Tobruk\(^40\). Like the argument over Tobruk, the ‘Cable Wars’ did not change Curtin’s opinion of the British Empire and Australia’s place in it. In April 1942, barely two months after his dispute with Churchill, Curtin stated that ‘Australia is a great bastion of Empire...Australia is proud of its sonship to the Motherland’\(^41\). The dispute also had no effect on Australian foreign policy. In 1943, he stated that Australia needed ‘the advantage of concerted Empire policy’\(^42\) in its future foreign policy and he appointed the Duke of Gloucester, the King’s brother, to the post of Governor-General of Australia an appointment that met with widespread public approval and outrage within his own party\(^43\). The ‘Cable Wars’ did not change Curtin’s belief that Australia was British or that Britain should continue to play an integral part in shaping Australian foreign policy. They did not prompt serious discussions about the merits of separation or distancing from

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\(^39\) Freudenberg, G., *op.cit.*, p. 390


\(^41\) Curran, J., *op.cit.*, p. 87

\(^42\) *ibid.*, p. 90

\(^43\) *ibid.*, p. 92
Britain and they were certainly not a defining moment in Australia’s relationship with Britain\(^{44}\).

The consistent nature of Australian policy with regard to Britain was made dramatically clear in 1944 when Curtin travelled to London for an Imperial Conference\(^{45}\). On May 4\(^{th}\) he stated in a speech: ‘I am not afraid of being misjudged when I say that I am a supporter of, and believer in, the British Empire...’\(^{46}\). More strikingly, he reflected that the war had ‘heartened...our association, has strengthened...that association [the British Empire]...the greatest confraternity of governmental relations the world has yet witnessed’\(^{47}\), a statement that directly contradicts the modern belief that the Pacific War weakened Australia’s relationship with Britain. At the conference in London, he proposed that there should be ‘machinery...to provide for full and continuous consultation’\(^{48}\). It is revealing that when Curtin gave his opinion on post-war international relations in a post-conference report to the Australian War Cabinet, he made no distinction between Australian foreign policy and the policy of the British Commonwealth as a whole\(^{49}\), adding that Australia should be seen internationally as part of the British Empire.

Not only did Curtin intend to follow Imperial foreign policy, he also stated that ‘the security of any part of the British Empire in the future will rest on...the system of collective

\(^{44}\) ibid., p. 86  
\(^{45}\) Mr Curtin’s Report to the Australian Parliament of the Prime Minister’s Meeting, Dated 9/9/1944, The National Archives [Britain], Catalogue Reference: cab/66/55/10, p. 1  
\(^{46}\) Black, D., In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings, Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995, p. 241  
\(^{47}\) ibid., p.242  
\(^{48}\) Mr Curtin’s Report to the Australian Parliament of the Prime Minister’s Meeting, op.cit., p. 8  
\(^{49}\) ibid., p. 5
security... [and] bilateral or multilateral planning\textsuperscript{50}. This is clear evidence of his belief that, despite the events of 1941-2 and the fall of Singapore, the system of Imperial defence\textsuperscript{51}, and not an alliance with the United States, would remain a key part of Australian defence policy. Sir Ronald Cross, the British High Commissioner in Australia, cabled that he ‘confidently...expect[ed] that cooperation in the future will be smoother, more sympathetic and pliant’\textsuperscript{52}, adding that members of the press gallery had told him they considered Curtin ‘as British as Churchill’\textsuperscript{53} and that Curtin’s ‘first act on resuming the reigns of office was to...give them [the press gallery] a good drubbing on the ground that their papers gave insufficient publicity to the British share on the Western Front and gave too much space to the USA’\textsuperscript{54}.

The Imperial Conference, and subsequent events, clearly demonstrated that the disagreements between Churchill and Curtin in 1941 and 1942 did not cause a profound shift in Australia’s relationship with Britain. On the contrary, Curtin believed that Australia should be internationally regarded as part of the British Empire and that the system of Imperial defence should be the foundation of post-war Australian defence, ideas identical to the policies of the Australian government throughout the inter-war period. John Curtin advocacy of Imperial international policy and defence in 1944 demonstrates that neither his appeal to the United States or the ‘Cable Wars’ were defining moments in Anglo-Australian relations.

\textsuperscript{50} ibid., p. 10

\textsuperscript{51} Imperial Defence was a system in which the Dominions and colonies of the British Empire would aid each other if one was threatened. It was, however, founded on the assumption that states were primarily responsible for their own defence and for equipping their own forces with everything but the heaviest of armaments.

\textsuperscript{52} Curran, J., \textit{op.cit.}, p. 115

\textsuperscript{53} ibid., p. 115

\textsuperscript{54} ibid., p. 115
John Curtin is remembered as one of Australia’s greatest Prime Ministers and several of his decisions during the Pacific War are generally regarded as defining moments in the relationship between Australia and Great Britain. Particularly important are his decision to declare war on Japan independently of Britain, his article *The Task Ahead* and the argument with Churchill now known as the ‘Cable Wars’. In reality, Australia declared war on Hungary, Romania and Finland on the advice of the British government before declaring war on Japan. *The Task Ahead* did not herald a change in Australia’s relationship with Britain and the ‘Cable Wars’ did not change Australia’s commitment to Imperial defence or the British Empire. In 1944, Curtin advocated a post-war return to the policies Australia had followed in the years after the First World War. A staunch believer in the British Empire and the British way of life, John Curtin’s term as Prime Minister did not change Australia’s relationship with Britain. On the contrary, he, and many Australians, fought for the idea of a strong British Empire with Australia as ‘a British land of one race and one tongue’.

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55 Curran, J., *op.cit.*, p. 84
Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources:

Articles

- Curtin, J., \textit{The Task Ahead}, Published: \textit{The Herald}, 27/12/1941, National Library of Australia

This article contains Curtin’s ‘\textit{Australia looks to America}’ statement and is widely regarded as one of the most important documents in our political history. It is quite controversial and is used as evidence to support a wide range of views and theories.

The problem with the article lies in the ambiguity of the statement ‘\textit{free of any pangs as to our traditional links…}’. Many historians have interpreted this as marking the point at which those traditional ties were severed. As Curtin himself stated, it meant the opposite, stating that a move towards an American alliance was not a turn from Britain.

Those historians who subscribe to the former interpretation almost all attempt to cast Curtin as the first champion of Australian nationalism and ‘\textit{The Task Ahead}’ as the defining moment at which Australia cast off the shackles of “British Imperialism” and became aware of its national identity. Perhaps the most prominent exponent of this idea is David Day, who theorised that the Pacific War was the point at which the Australian government started to aggressively pursue its national interest regardless of British opinion and turned to the United States.
Cables

- 278. *Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Winston Churchill, U.K. Prime Minister*,
  Dated 17/1/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications,
  Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.1701

In this telegram, Curtin suggested to Churchill that the defences in Malaya, particularly the air support, were deficient and emphasised the importance of Singapore to the Australian government. Curtin had been concerned that the British forces were retreating down the Malayan peninsular in the face of the Japanese forces.

- 340. *Mr. R.G. Casey, Minister to the United States, to Department of External Affairs*,
  Dated 17/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications,
  Catalogue Reference: AA:A981, WAR 33, ATTACHMENT B

Casey was the Australian representative in Washington in 1941-2. The cable is mostly concerned with getting American troops to Australia and persuading the Americans that Australia would be a good place to station them but paragraph 6 contains the first suggestion that Australian troops should be diverted from Australia to India or Burma. It is explicitly stated that the President considered the defence of both very important.

- 341. *Sir Earle Page, Special Representative in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister*, Dated 18/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

Casey here related the decisions taken at the Pacific War Council meeting in London. The main conclusion was that forces on Java could only delay, not beat back, that Japanese and that sending Australian troops there would be futile. Instead, the 7th Division should be sent to Burma, followed by the 70th British Division, and the 6th sent to Australia.
As Cable 341 merely related the conclusion of meeting, Page followed it with another giving his personal opinion of the matter. He stated that, in his view, the defence of the Burma Road was of vital importance in keeping China in the war and, as a result, the Australian troops should be sent there until replacements became available. He also stated that he greatly admired the Dutch for ‘their readiness to do what was best in the ultimate interests of the whole fight even though their own country was really being left to its own resources’. This was certainly a hint to Curtin as the statement could just have easily referred to the position the Australians felt they were in.

Bruce’ cable reiterates Casey’s arguments for the diversion of troops to Burma. Like Page, he emphasised the importance of keeping the Burmese Road open and stated that selflessly agreeing to send Australian troops to Burma would give the government greater leverage if they had to make a similar demand.
In this cable, Curtin informed Page that the Australian government would not agree to the proposed diversion on the ground that Australia was itself in imminent danger, a belief no doubt reinforced by the bombing of Darwin a few days before.

- 352. Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 20/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

Although listed as being from Clement Attlee, who was Acting Prime Minister while Churchill was in the United States, Churchill replied to Curtin, clearly furious that Curtin had refused to allow Australian troops to be sent to Burma. He responded to Curtin’s accusation that the fall of Singapore had endangered Australia and stated that the government’s refusal would result in the withdrawal of American troops.

- 357. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Dated 22/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade: Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5403

This was the response to the previous cable, sent two days after Churchill’s cable was received. The intervening cables were from Page, Bruce, Casey and the UK Dominions Office forwarding a message from Roosevelt, all attempting to persuade the Australian government to send troops. Roosevelt’s cable is particularly important as it offered extra troops for Australia, rather than the withdrawal of support Churchill had threatened.

Curtin informed Churchill that the Australian government would not agree to the proposed diversion, rebuking him for publically endorsing sending the two divisions from the Middle East to Australia and then proposing their diversion to Rangoon and stating that Australia had already made a significant contribution to the war effort in the Pacific. He ended with a
request that Churchill tell Roosevelt that it was only Australia’s apparently dire predicament that led him to refuse to allow the diversion.

- **362. Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 22/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:**
  Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A816, 52/302/142

On the same day Curtin reiterated his refusal in Cable 357, Churchill cabled informing the Australian government that the convoy had been diverted before they had reached a decision. This was particularly significant because Churchill appeared to have treated Australian consent as a matter of form, rather than a vital consideration. It is worth noting, however, that the British Government had been led to believe by Earle Page that the Australian government would undoubtedly agree.

- **364. Mr S. M. Bruce, High Commissioner in the United Kingdom, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, Dated 23/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:**
  Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:M100, FEBRUARY 1942

Bruce saw a copy of Churchill’s Cable 362 in London and wrote to Curtin, expressing outrage but advising restraint on the grounds that any breech in the relationship between Australia and Britain would be disastrous.

- **366. Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, Dated 23/2/1942, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade:**
  Historical Publications, Catalogue Reference: AA:A3196, 1942, 0.5424
Curtin spurned Bruce’ advice and lashed out at Churchill, accusing him of lying to the government, endangering Australia and, more seriously from Churchill’s perspective, with mismanaging the campaigns in Greece, Crete and the Pacific.


Churchill replied to Curtin, informing him that the convoy, which had been diverted to Burma, would return to Colombo to refuel before proceeding to Australia. He offered a brief explanation for the diversion, explaining that he had had to make a decision before Curtin’s response to his Cable 352 arrived and that the escort had been, and would remain, reinforced.

Multimedia


In this speech, Curtin announced that Australia was at war with Japan. Unlike Menzies, he made it clear that Australia was directly threatened by Japan and that Australia was not going to war solely to support Britain. He did, however, state his determination to maintain Australia as a British nation and to the threat Japan posed to Australia’s ‘imperishable traditions’, an oblique reference to the White Australia policy Japan had frequently challenged.
It is worth noting that this broadcast was not a formal declaration of war, merely an announcement that Australia intended to go to war. Curtin stated that Australia, like Britain and the United States, would make a formal declaration the following day.


This was Menzies’ announcement to the Australian public that Australia was at war with Germany following his invasion of Poland and Britain’s declaration of war. Unlike the rhetoric of politicians at the start of the First World War, there is no sense of jubilation or excitement. It is, however, made clear that Australia would stand behind ‘the motherland’.

Parliamentary Documents

- Mr Curtin’s Report to the Australian Parliament of the Prime Minister’s Meeting, Dated 9/9/1944, The National Archives [Britain], Catalogue Reference: cab/66/55/10

Curtin outlines the proposals he took to London regarding post-war cooperation within the Empire but glosses over the true reactions of the Prime Ministers of South Africa, Canada and New Zealand, none of whom favoured greater ties with Britain. He also states that Australia should continue to follow Imperial international and defence policy. The report also contains mentions of several post-war policies implemented by his successor Ben Chifley, particularly the agreement to bring British orphans to Australia and the policy of selling Australian primary food products to Britain significantly below the world price, another indication of Australia’s continued attachment to Britain.
Secondary Sources:

Books

- Black, D., *In His Own Words: John Curtin’s Speeches and Writings*, Paradigm Books Curtin University, Bentley, 1995

As the title suggests, this is essentially a collection of Curtin’s papers and speeches. A significant part of the book consists of articles from his time as editor of the *Westralian Worker* and documents dealing with his ascent to power but there is also material from his time as Leader of the Opposition and then as Prime Minister. While there are notes attached to most of the documents, placing them in context, there is very little analysis of their significance.


A fascinating study in Curtin’s attitude towards Britain, it is disappointingly short and passes over the period from 1941 to 1944. As a consequence, it does not consider the effect of the Pacific War on Australia. It does, however, provide a thorough analysis of the course and implications of the Imperial Conference in 1944.


A compilation and expansion of two of Day’s previous works, *The Great Betrayal* and *Reluctant Nation*, it advances the theory that the British, throughout the inter-war period and the war, deliberately deceived a series of Australian governments about Imperial Defence, Singapore and the situation with Japan in order to gain their cooperation and ensure they remained supportive and pliant. He portrays Curtin as one of the first Australian Prime Ministers to aggressively assert Australian independence and ensure that Australian, rather than British, interests remained paramount. Evidence shows, however, that he wanted greater
consultation between Britain and the Dominions leading the formulation of a common imperial policy.

  Day’s biography of Curtin covers his early life and move from journalism to politics. It does, however, contain an extensive section on his time as Prime Minister and his confrontations with Churchill. The material, and the perspective presented, is similar in content and tone to his book *The Politics of War*.

  Although Freudenburg is primarily concerned with Churchill’s relationship to Australia, the section dealing with 1941-45 is detailed and contains a fascinating examination of Anglo-Australian relations during that period. As a long standing supporter of the Labor Party and a self-confessed admirer of John Curtin, he paints a complementary picture of Curtin as Prime Minister and is very critical of Churchill’s account of events. Despite this, there is little sense of the obvious bias that is present in works by many other historians dealing with the period and his praise of Curtin is justified.

  Although mostly concerned with the legalities of the Australian relationship with Britain and the evolution of the Australian constitution, it also contains interesting information about the politics of the relationship and the circumstances of Australia’s independent declaration of war against Hungary, Finland and Romania.
Websites (with author)

  The source is a brief outline of Curtin’s life including his Prime Ministership. Of particular interest was the account of the downfall of Menzies and Curtin’s appointment as Prime Minister at the head of a minority government dependent on the support of independent MPs.

  Although it dwells mostly on the stories of Australians who were affected by the fall of Singapore, the source does provide a background to the events leading to its fall.

  David Horner is arguably one of the most prominent contemporary Australian historians. Particularly interesting is his account of the relationship between Curtin and Shedden. This is supported by many other historians.

Although it contains little in the way of detail about the circumstances of each declaration of war or Australia’s involvement in the conflict, the timeline and records clearly show that Australia declared war on Hungary, Romania and Finland before Japan, an assertion supported by the book *Australia’s Independence*.

**Websites (without author)**


This website contains suggestions for possible topics for the National History Challenge John Curtin Prize, citing Australia’s declaration of war against Japan as the first time Australia had declared war independently and offering this as an example of a turning point. It goes on to suggest that the ‘Cable Wars’ were also a defining moment.
Appendices

Appendix A: *The Task Ahead*, by John Curtin, 27th December 1941

By John Curtin

That reddish veil which o’er the face
Of night-long East is drawn...
Flames new disaster for the race?
Or can it be the Dawn?

So wrote Bernard O’Dwyer, I see 1942 as this year in which we shall know the answer.
I wrote, however, that we should know the answer.
We can, and we will. Therefore I see 1942 as a year of immense change in Australian life.
The Australian Government’s policy has been ground on two facts. One is that the war with Japan is not a phase of the struggle with the Axis powers, but is a new war.
The second is that Australia must go on to a war footing.

Those two facts involve two lines of action—one in the direction of external policy as to our dealings with Britain, the United States, Russia, the Netherlands East Indies and China in the higher direction of the war in the Pacific.
The second is the remaining, almost the revolutionary, of the Australian way of life until now. Economic life is adjusted, quickly, efficiently, and with no question.

The Australian Government therefore regards the Pacific struggle as primarily one in which the United States and Australia must have the fullest say in the direction of the Democratic nations’ joint plan.
Without any illusions of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, first of all, in its war in the Pacific and then in its warship with the United Kingdom.

We know the problems that the United Kingdom faces. We know the constant threat of invasion. We know the danger of dispersing strength. But we know too that Australia can go, and Britain can still hold on.
We are therefore determined that Australia shall not go, but we shall exert all our resources toward the success of a plan, with the United States as its keystone, which will give to our country some confidence of being able to hold out until the time of battle swings against the enemy.

Summed up, Australian external policy will be shaped toward obtaining Russian aid, and working not with the United States, as the major factor, a plan of early strategy, along with British, Chinese and Dutch forces.

Australians must assume the responsibility of bringing the Australian people to a realization of what, after two years of war, our position has become. Even the entry of Japan, bringing a direct conflict in our own waters, was met with a spontaneous view that the Americans would deal with the short-sighted, unfounded and fanatical Japanese.

The announcement that no further appeals would be made to the Australian people, and that the decisions that followed, were motivated by psychological factors. There had been an apparent threat to the American war effort. The Australians had the attitude that was imperative if we were to exercise ourselves, to enter an all-in effort in the only possible manner.

That experiment in psychological warfare has succeeded, and we commence 1942 in a position where the Commonwealth Government found it exceedingly difficult to bring the Australian people to a realization of what, after two years of war, our position had become. The year 1942 will open promising terms. These terms will impose on us the most rigorous economy, on the inevitable need of more and more draining, not only the economic but the mental preparation of the people that is to be done in 1942.

Australia faces internally for across potential and sweeping anything that contributed to in 1914.

The year 1942 will impose severe tests. These tests will be met with the inevitable need of more and more draining, not only the economic but the mental preparation of the people that is to be done in 1942.

Mr Curtin

The decisions were prompted by other reasons, all related to the necessity of getting into a war footing, and the results are far achieved, and the country has been most benign, especially in respect of production and conservation of stocks.

I make it clear that the experiment undertaken was never intended as one to awaken Australian patriotism or sense of duty. Those cultures have been over-sentimental, but the result is that the country has been most benign, especially in respect of production and conservation of stocks.

Our task for 1943 is clear. The Government is in a position to stand firm in the face of any attack. The nation is the one that has to take the initia-
Appendix B: Winston Churchill’s Cable to John Curtin on the 20th February 1942

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Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister

Cablegram 233 LONDON, 20 February 1942, 9.13 p.m.

MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET

Following for the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister. (Begins):

I suppose you realise that your leading division, the head of which is sailing south of Colombo to N.E.I. at this moment in our scanty British and American shipping [(MOUNT VERNON)], is the only force that can reach Rangoon in time to prevent its loss and the severance of communication with China. It can begin to disembark at Rangoon about 26th or 27th. There is nothing else in the world that can fill the gap.

2. We are all entirely in favour of all Australian troops returning home to defend their native soil, and we shall help their transportation in every way. But a vital war emergency cannot be ignored, and troops en route to other destinations must be ready to turn aside and take part in a battle. Every effort would be made to relieve this division at the earliest moment and send them on to Australia. I do not endorse the United States' request that you should send your other two divisions to Burma. They will return home as fast as possible but this one is needed now, and is the only one that can possibly save the situation.
3. Pray read again your message No. JOHCU 21 in which you said that the evacuation of Singapore would be 'an inexcusable betrayal'. Agreeably with your point of view we therefore [put] the 18th Division and other important reinforcements into Singapore instead of diverting them to Burma and ordered them to fight it out to the end. They were lost at Singapore and did not save it, whereas they could almost certainly have saved Rangoon. I take full responsibility with my colleagues on the Defence Committee for this decision; but you also bear a heavy share on account of your telegram No. JOHCU 21.

4. Your greatest support in this hour of peril must be drawn from the United States. They alone can bring into Australia the necessary troops and air forces and they appear ready to do so. As you know, the President attaches supreme importance to keeping open the connection with China without which his bombing offensive against Japan cannot be started and also most grievous results may follow in Asia if China is cut off from all allied help.

5. I am quite sure that if you refuse to allow your troops to stop this gap who are actually passing and if in consequence the above [evils] affecting the whole course of the war follow, a very grave effect will be produced upon the President and the Washington circle on whom you are so largely dependent. See especially the inclination of the United States to move major naval forces from Hawaii into the Anzac area.

6. We must have an answer immediately, as the leading ships of the convoy will soon be steaming in the opposite direction from Rangoon and every day is a day lost. I trust therefore that for the sake of all interests, and above all your own interests, you will give most careful consideration to the case I have set before you. (Ends).
Appendix C: John Curtin’s Cable to Winston Churchill on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of February 1942

Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister, to Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs

Cablegram 136 CANBERRA, 22 February 1942

MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET

For the Prime Minister from the Prime Minister.

Reference your 233 and 235.

I have received your rather strongly worded request at this late stage, though our wishes in regard to the disposition of the A.I.F. in the Pacific theatre have long been known to you and carried even further by your statement in the House of Commons. Furthermore, Page was furnished with lengthy statements on our viewpoint on 15th February (repeated to Dominions Office in No. 123), 17th February (repeated to Dominions Office in No. 127) and 19th February (two cablegrams).

2. The proposal for additional military assistance for Burma comes from the Supreme Commander of the A.B.D.A. Area. Malaya, Singapore and Timor have been lost and the whole of the Netherlands East Indies will apparently be occupied shortly by the Japanese. The enemy, with superior sea and air power, has commenced raiding our territory in the north-west and also in the north-east from Rabaul. The Government made the maximum contribution of which it was capable in reinforcement of the A.B.D.A. Area. It originally sent a division less a brigade to Malaya with certain ancillary troops. A machine gun battalion and substantial reinforcements were later despatched. It also despatched forces to Ambon, Java.
and Dutch and Portuguese Timor. Six squadrons of the Air Force were also sent to this area, together with two cruisers from the Royal Australian Navy.

3. It was suggested by you that two Australian divisions be transferred to the Pacific theatre and this suggestion was later publicly expanded by you with the statement that no obstacle would be placed in the way of the A.I.F. returning to defend their homeland. We agreed to the two divisions being located in Sumatra and Java and it was pointed out to Page in the cablegram of 15th February that should fortune still favour the Japanese this disposition would give a line of withdrawal to Australia for our forces.

4. With the situation having deteriorated to such an extent in the theatre of the A.B.D.A. Area with which we are closely associated and the Japanese also making a southward advance in the Anzac Area, the Government, in the light of the advice of its Chiefs of Staff as to the forces necessary to repel an attack on Australia, finds it most difficult to understand that it should be called upon to make a further contribution of forces to be located in the most distant part of the A.B.D.A. Area. Notwithstanding your statement that you do not agree with the request to send the other two divisions of the A.I.F. Corps to Burma, our advisers are concerned with Wavell's request for the Corps and Dill's statement that the destination of the 6th and 9th Australian Divisions should be left open, as more troops might be badly needed in Burma. Once one division became engaged it could not be left unsupported, and the indications are that the whole of the Corps might become committed to this region or there might be a recurrence of the experiences of the Greek and Malayan campaigns. Finally, in view of superior Japanese sea power and air power, it would appear to be a matter of some doubt as to whether this division can be landed in Burma and a matter for greater doubt whether it can be brought out as promised. With the fall of Singapore, Penang and Martaban, the Bay of Bengal is now
vulnerable to what must be considered the superior sea and air power of Japan in that area. The movement of our forces to this theatre therefore is not considered a reasonable hazard of war, having regard to what has gone before, and its adverse results would have the gravest consequences on the morale of the Australian people. The Government therefore must adhere to its decision.

5. In regard to your statement that the 18th Division was diverted from Burma to Singapore because of message No. Johcu 21, it is pointed out that the date of the latter was 23rd January, whereas in Winch No. 8 of 14th January you informed me that one brigade of this division was due on 13th January and the remainder on 27th January.

6. We feel therefore, in view of the foregoing and the services the A.I.F. have rendered in the Middle East, that we have every right to expect them to be returned as soon as possible with adequate escorts to ensure their safe arrival.

7. We assure you, and desire you to so inform the President, who knows fully what we have done to help the common cause, that, if it were possible to divert our troops to Burma and India without imperilling our security in the judgment of our advisers, we should be pleased to agree to the diversion.

CURTIN
Appendix D: Winston Churchill’s cable to John Curtin on the 22\textsuperscript{nd} of February 1942

Mr Clement Attlee, U.K. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, to Mr John Curtin, Prime Minister

Cablegram 241 LONDON, 22 February 1942, 3 p.m.

MOST IMMEDIATE MOST SECRET

Following from the Prime Minister [1] for the Prime Minister. (Begins):-

We could not contemplate that you would refuse our request and that of the President of the United States for the diversion of the leading division to save the situation in Burma. We knew that if our ships proceeded on their course to Australia while we were waiting for your formal approval they would either arrive too late at Rangoon or even be without enough fuel to go there at all. We therefore decided that the convoy should be temporarily diverted to the northward. The convoy is now too far north for some of the ships in it to reach Australia without refuelling. These physical considerations give a few days for the situation to develop and for you to review the position should you wish to do so. Otherwise the leading Australian Division will be returned to Australia as quickly as possible in accordance with your wishes.

(Ends).