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


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**ALEXANDER KERENSKY: WHAT COULD
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National History Challenge

Abstract

In June 1917, Alexander Kerensky had the power to transform Russia into a liberal democracy. But political miscalculations, missed opportunities and harsh realities saw his dreams fall apart by November that same year. His political career ended in turmoil and with it his hope of Russian democracy.

Alexander Kerensky: What Could Have Been

One man's exercise of power in the aftermath of Russia's February Revolution changed the course of human history. His name was not Lenin, Stalin, or Trotsky, rather Alexander Kerensky. The defence-lawyer-turned Socialist Revolutionary served as the head of Russia's Provisional Government from July to October 1917. Persuasive oratory and the pursuit of civil liberties gained him popularity, whereas his refusal to sue for peace in the First World War damaged his reputation. The Kornilov Affair, in which General Kornilov marched on Petrograd, undermined the Prime Minister's authority as it cast the Bolsheviks as defenders of revolution. Hence, Kerensky's political miscalculations coupled with the political climate of the time facilitated the fall of Russian democracy and his irreversible loss of power.

Born 4 May 1881 in Ulyanovsk, Russia, Kerensky rose to prominence as a lawyer in the years preceding the Russian Revolutions of 1917. The lawyer's political ambitions developed while defending peasants against the autocracy's abuses of power. His defence of Mendel Beilis, a Jewish man accused of ritual murder, brought him to public notice as a defender of ethnic minorities.¹ The benefit of his time as a lawyer was twofold: he discovered the injustices of the legal system and that many peasants wanted to rid Russia of the Tsar. Kerensky stood for the agrarian Trudovik party, a small workers circle formerly a part of the Socialist Revolutionary Party, at the Fourth State Duma in September 1912.² He was elected to the Duma as the "toast of the people".³ Kerensky rose to further prominence when he switched to the Socialist Revolutionary party in January 1917.⁴ This move expanded his appeal to Russia's peasant class,⁵ demonstrating his plan to exercise power through popular support. By the time of the February

¹ Masis, J. (2017). *Before the Bolsheviks, this man abolished Russia's Pale of Settlement*. [online] timesofisrael.com. Available at: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/before-the-bolsheviks-this-man-abolished-russias-pale-of-settlement/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

² Browder, R. (1970). Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky: 1881-1970. *The Russian Review*, Vol. 29, Wiley: London. p. 484.

³ Figs, O. (1988). Review of Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution by Richard Abraham. *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 31, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 494.

⁴ McKean, R. (1989). Review of Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution by Richard Abraham. *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 104, Oxford University Press: Oxford. p. 147.

⁵ Browder, op. cit., p. 484.

Revolution, he was “at the centre of a vortex of human passion and conflicting ambitions”.⁶ On February 27 Kerensky attacked the Tsar and demanded that “he must be removed, by force if there is no other way, to prevent a catastrophe”.⁷ Hence, the Provisional Government, headed by Prince Lvov, formed on March 13. Kerensky, as the new Minister of Justice, abolished capital punishment and religious discrimination, while also promoting freedom of speech and universal suffrage.⁸ The lawyer’s popularity propelled him to the forefront of social and political power.

The Provisional Government from its outset faced the issues of bread, land and peace as outlined in Lenin's *April Theses*.⁹ Kerensky replaced Alexander Guchkov as Minister of War in May 1917.¹⁰ Whether to sue for peace was of pressing concern. He was in a dilemma: Russia relied on war loans from Allies which kept the economy afloat,¹¹ but staying in the war antagonised the suffering proletariat and peasantry. Kerensky placed interests of the state above those of the people and the longer the war continued the “wider the gulf between these two interests became”.¹² Thus, the longer Russia remained in the war, the more it endangered the Provisional Government’s authority. Kerensky evaded this threat during early 1917 with persuasive oratory that stoked fear. He proclaimed in a speech to the masses, “For the sake of the nation’s life it is necessary to restore the army’s will to die”.¹³ Furthermore, his fast-paced

⁶ Kerensky as cited by Whitman, A. (1970). *Alexander Kerensky Dies Here at 89*. [online] nytimes.com. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/opinion/the-february-revolution-and-kerenskys-missed-opportunity.html> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

⁷ Kerensky as cited by Simkin, J. (1997). *Alexander Kerensky*. [online] spartacus-educational.com. Available at: <https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSkerensky.htm> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

⁸ Christian, D. (1994). *Power and Privilege: The Russian Empire, The Soviet Union and the Challenge of Modernity*. Palgrave USA: New York. p. 174.

⁹ Lynch, M. (1986). *Reaction and Revolution: Russia 1894-1924 Third Edition*. Holder Murray: London. p. 100.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ Newton, D. (1989). Review of *Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution* by Richard Abraham. *New Zealand Slavonic Journal*, Australia and New Zealand Slavists’ Association: Sydney. p. 216.

¹² Figes, *op. cit.*, p. 495.

¹³ Kerensky as cited by Llewellyn, J, Rae, J and Thompson, S. (2014). *Russian Revolution Quotations*. [online] alphahistory.com. Available at: <https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/russian-revolution-quotations/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

tone coupled with rapid gestures challenged his audience to "transcend their limitations".¹⁴ In this sense, he garnered immense power through fear mongering. Russian soldiers, in turn, remained invested in the war effort. They rejoiced at his tours of the front and "kissed Kerensky, his uniform, his car, and the ground on which he walked".¹⁵ But his popularity led soldiers into the disastrous June Offensive that resulted in 200,000 casualties.¹⁶ The failure signified the military's weakness and Kerensky's refusal to accept calls for peace.

In response to the failed Bolshevik coup during the July Days (July 3 - 7), Prince Lvov resigned as Prime Minister on July 7 and Lvov supported Kerensky's nomination for the Prime Ministership. He did so because "the only way to save the country now is to close down the Soviet and shoot the people. I cannot do that. But Kerensky can".¹⁷ Kerensky did what Lvov could not: he suppressed the Bolshevik threat through violence and a skilful propaganda campaign. Passionate speeches claimed Lenin "is promoting the defeat of his own country" as an agent paid by German high command.¹⁸ Lenin, as a result, retreated to Finland and the popular Marxist-controlled *Pravda* (Truth) newspaper closed.¹⁹ Although these swift actions damaged the Bolsheviks, they survived due to the Provisional Government's critical misjudgement on land policy.

¹⁴ Acton, E. (1989). Review of Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution by Richard Abraham. *The Historian*, Vol. 51, Wiley: London. p. 346.

¹⁵ Fielding, M and Morcombe, M. (1998). *The Spirit of Change: Russia in Revolution*. McGraw-Hill Education: Sydney. p. 111.

¹⁶ Feldman, R. (1968). The Russian General Staff and the June 1917 Offensive. *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 19, Taylor & Francis, Ltd: Didcot. p. 531.

¹⁷ Lvov as cited by Llewellyn, J, Rae, J and Thompson, S. (2014). *Russian Revolution Quotations*. [online] alphahistory.com. Available at: <https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/russian-revolution-quotations/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

¹⁸ Lynch, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

¹⁹ Mosse, W. (1964). Interlude: The Russian Provisional Government 1917. *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 15, Taylor & Francis: Didcot. p. 411.

Lvov had not supported peasants seizing land, whereas Kerensky as "the only true socialist within the cabinet" had argued for reform.²⁰ Thus, his position on the issue of land set an expectation of radical change. Peasants felt duped when he under-delivered. He set up an advisory Land Commission but maintained that the not-yet-elected Constituent Assembly would hold the authority to resolve the issue.²¹ Moreover, wartime conditions made an election of the Constituent Assembly impractical, reaffirming peasants' perception that the intelligentsia was delaying action. Lenin seized on his enemy's weakness and proclaimed 'Land to the Peasants'.²² By August, Bolshevik membership surged to over 200,000.²³ Therefore, the land question undermined Kerensky's power as he grew out-of-touch with public sentiment.

The Kornilov Affair served as the defining moment of Kerensky's Prime Ministership as his response to the crisis expedited the Provisional Government's collapse. British historian Richard Abraham casts General Lavr Kornilov as a monarchist villain with, what General Alekseev called, "a lion's heart and the brains of a sheep".²⁴ Evidence, however, from August 1917 indicates this is not the case. Indeed, Kerensky's inept handling of the crisis suggests that if anyone, *he* had the brains of a sheep. Due to a lack of clear communication, the General's planned establishment of a military dictatorship struggled to gain Kerensky's approval. Vladimir Lvov (not to be confused with Prince Lvov) acted as a self-appointed intermediary whose "irresponsible chatter and alarmist stories confirmed Kerensky's worst fears".²⁵ Kornilov left meetings "convinced Kerensky was ready to cooperate" with a military coup, whereas Lvov

²⁰ Llewellyn, J, Rae, J and Thompson, S. (2014). *The Provisional Government*. [online] alphahistory.com. Available at: <https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/provisional-government/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

²¹ Figes, *op cit.*, p. 496.

²² Lynch, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

²³ Thatcher, I. (2015). Post-Soviet Russian Historians and the Russian Provisional Government of 1917. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 93, The Modern Humanities Research Association and University College: London. p. 316.

²⁴ Abraham, R. (1987). *Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution*. Columbia University Press: New York. p. 347.

²⁵ Williams, H. (1991). The Socialist Revolutionary Party, Kerensky and the Kornilov Affair: from the unpublished papers of Harold W. Williams. *New Zealand Journal*, Australia and New Zealand Slavists' Association: Sydney. p. 152.

relayed the opposite to the Prime Minister.²⁶ Thus, the tragic case of miscommunication prompted Kerensky's overreaction to Kornilov's march toward Petrograd on August 27. Without any further evidence, except a vague telegram exchange with Kornilov from which one cannot prove a conspiracy,²⁷ he "raised a cry of panic against Kornilov and flung himself on the Soviet for support".²⁸ By releasing Bolsheviks from prison and offering them weapons, Kerensky thrust the Red Guard into the position as the defender of the revolution. Moreover, Kornilov's arrest disillusioned his generals, including Anton Deniken, the future White Army leader.²⁹ This, in turn, left the Provisional Government with less military support. Consequently, the Kornilov Affair signified Kerensky's loss of demonstrable power.

By October 1917, Kerensky's dwindling grip on power and Russia's perseverance in the unpopular war facilitated the Provisional Government's downfall. A month earlier he failed to recoup lost authority despite proclaiming Russia a socialist republic and filling his cabinet with socialist ministers.³⁰ It was, however, too little, too late for Kerensky. For too long he had refused the principle demand of Petrograd workers: Russia's immediate withdrawal from the war. Morale within factories and the army reached dire lows; October prices for manufactured goods were 755% higher than pre-war levels.³¹ Two million deserters from the front reflected the sentiment for peace.³² Thus, Kerensky was no longer the hostage of the masses, beholden to popular demand, but the hostage of the state and Prime Minister only in name. Then came the fateful events of late October. Sensing the growing revolutionary sentiment, Kerensky ordered a pre-emptive strike. The closure of the *Izvestia* (News) and *Pravda* (Truth) newspapers

²⁶ Asher, H. (1970). The Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation. *The Russian Review*, Vol. 29, Wiley: London. p. 294.

²⁷ Strakhovsky, L. (1955). Was There a Kornilov Rebellion? A Re-Appraisal of the Evidence. *The Slavonic and European Review*, Vol. 33, the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College: London. p. 375.

²⁸ Williams, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

²⁹ Schlesinger, R. (1964). Review of The Russian Provisional Government, 1917; Documents by Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky. *Science & Society*, Vol. 28, Guilford: New York. p. 310.

³⁰ Llewellyn, J, Rae, J and Thompson, S. (2014). *Alexander Kerensky*. [online] alphahistory.com. Available at: <https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/alexander-kerensky/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

³¹ Christian, *op. cit.*, p. 177.

³² Whitman, *op. cit.*

prompted the formation of the Bolshevik Military Revolutionary Committee on October 17.³³ Red Guards stormed the Winter Palace within the month, forcing Kerensky's escape in a car owned by the American Embassy.³⁴ Although it is unlikely he left disguised in a nurse's outfit (a myth propagated by Bolshevik propaganda films),³⁵ the ordeal was nevertheless embarrassing. Kerensky rose to power in February as "the first love of the revolution";³⁶ yet nine months later he fled Petrograd. Indeed, one cannot help but feel remorse for the leader whose desperate attempts to unite Russia, merely assisted in its governing body's demise.

Kerensky failed to recapture Petrograd in late October 1917 as he had lost the hearts and minds of Russia's proletariat. In the immediate aftermath of the October coup, Kerensky, still acted as if he maintained authority. American journalist John Reed recounts the Prime Minister's "fatal blunder" when crossing Tsarskoye Selo on 29 October. He demanded Cossacks join the counter-coup but "from that moment there were no more 'neutral' soldiers in Tsarskoye".³⁷ As ardent anti-Bolsheviks, even the Cossacks' refusal to support Kerensky signified his complete loss of power. He fled abroad hoping Britain and France would offer their support.³⁸ British Prime Minister David Lloyd George and French Premier Georges Clemenceau refused his pleas even though both had pressured the Provisional Government into staying in the war.³⁹ His blind loyalty to the Allies served as another political failure as it did not benefit him when needed. With foreign intervention unlikely, Kerensky spent most of his later years in American

³³ Gill G. (1978). The Failure of Rural Policy in Russia, February-October 1917. *Slavic Review*, Vol. 37, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 257.

³⁴ British Library, (2017). *Alexander Kerensky*. [online] bl.uk. Available at: <https://www.bl.uk/people/alexander-kerensky#> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

³⁵ Kerensky, A. (1927). *The Catastrophe*. D. Appleton and Company: New York. p. 74.

³⁶ Hughes, M. (2017). *The legacy of Alexander Kerensky, Russia's last leader before the Bolshevik revolution*. [online] independent.co.uk. Available at: <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long-reads/alexander-kerensky-russia-bolshevik-revolution-interview-1917-centenary-a8036256.html> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

³⁷ Reed, J. (2006). *Ten Days That Shook the World (Value Edition)*. Dover Publishers: New York. p. 181.

³⁸ Raleigh, D. (1988). Review of *Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution* by Richard Abraham. *Slavic Review*, Vol. 47, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 739.

³⁹ Figes, *op cit*, p. 498.

exile.⁴⁰ He refused to support the White Army during Russia's Civil War, ascribing conservatives' disloyalty as "the main reason for the defeat of Russian democracy".⁴¹ By casting blame onto Kornilov and Deniken, Kerensky overlooked his political misjudgements. Such is the nature of a leader who grasps power for a short period and spends the rest of his life defending his record. Given that Kerensky outlived most of those who played a leading role in the Russian Revolutions, dying in 1970, he had opportunities to rewrite his own history.

Kerensky's legacy is one of 'what could have been'; what Russia would have looked like under a democratic government instead of Bolshevism. Although history will never know the answer, his tenure as Minister of Justice laid the foundations for freedom of press, speech and religion.⁴² In this sense, 'what could have been' under Kerensky reinforces the bleak reality of what Russia became under Lenin and Stalin: a country controlled by fear and riddled with hunger. Russian democracy collapsed due to Kerensky's political mistakes. His refusal to leave the war and redistribute land antagonised peasants and the proletariat to the point where Bolsheviks faced little resistance when storming the Winter Palace.⁴³ Moreover, Kerensky's failures were also due to Russia's political landscape at the time. He was often stuck between the interests of the Soviets, such as Alexander Antonov, pushing for land reforms and monarchists, principally Nicholas Nikolaevich, wishing for a return to Tsardom.⁴⁴ Trotsky levelled the accusation that Kerensky "was not a revolutionist; he merely hung around the revolution".⁴⁵ Although his pursuit of civil liberties brought Russia up to date with most of the Western world, they proved far less satisfying than the proletariat and peasantry expected. This should not have come as a surprise. The

⁴⁰ Quiggin, J. (2017). *The February Revolution and Kerensky's Missed Opportunity*. [online] nytimes.com. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/opinion/the-february-revolution-and-kerenskys-missed-opportunity.html> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

⁴¹ Kerensky as cited by Whitman, *op cit*.

⁴² Kerensky, A. (1932). The Policy of the Provisional Government of 1917. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 11, The Modern Humanities Research Association and University College. London. p. 9.

⁴³ Elkin, B. (1964). The Kerensky Government and Its Fate. *Slavic Review*, Vol. 23, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. p. 736.

⁴⁴ Kolonitskii, B and Cohen, Y. (2009). Russian Historiography of the 1917 Revolution: New Challenges to Old Paradigms? *History and Memory*, Vol. 21, Indiana University Press: Bloomington. p. 59.

⁴⁵ Trotsky as cited by Whitman, *op. cit*.

Provisional Government was at its heart an extension of the Duma, which had represented the interests of the bourgeoisie and intelligentsia.⁴⁶ History remembers Kerensky as a naive leader who the more he exercised power, the less he managed to charm Russia into the mould of a liberal republic.

In the space of a single year - 1917 - Alexander Kerensky rose to and fell from the pinnacle of power. His oratory had gained him popularity and helped overthrow the Tsar. But as the Minister of War, he was responsible for the failed June Offensive which weakened the army's morale. His reluctance to pull Russia out of war antagonised revolutionaries, while his mishandling of the Kornilov Affair resurrected the Bolsheviks as a potent political force. These failures culminated in the October Revolution. Faced with communist rule, he abandoned Petrograd and lived out his years in exile. This tragic tale reminds society that power only in name is futile. Influencing hearts and minds effectively is what separates the puppets from the puppeteer, the people from the power.

⁴⁶ Trueman, C. (2015). *The Provisional Government*. [online] historylearningsites.co.uk. Available at: <https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/russia-1900-to-1939/the-provisional-government/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

Annotated Bibliography

Acton, E. (1989). Review of Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution by Richard Abraham. *The Historian*, Vol. 51, Wiley: London. pp. 345-346.

Acton puts forth a study of the successes and failures of Kerensky's time in politics. The source is fairly reliable as it synthesises a variety of viewpoints, specifically in relation to Kerensky's role in the Kornilov Affair. Thus, the text is a highly useful resource tool.

Abjornsen, N. (2017). *Alexander Kerensky: from the Russian Revolution to Australia*. [online] smh.com.au. Available at: <https://www.smh.com.au/world/alexander-kerensky-from-the-russian-revolution-to-australia-20170711-gx8wvf.html> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

Abjornsen recounts Kerensky's connection to Australia. The source, though interesting, is not really that useful in respect to its limited information of Kerensky's time as Prime Minister of Russia. Hence, the article is recommended solely for an audience interested in Kerensky's post-political life.

Abraham, R. (1987). *Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution*. Columbia University Press: New York.

Abraham's biography offers an insight into Kerensky's Prime Ministership. Although the text is highly informative, with first and second-hand accounts of Kerensky's persuasive oratory style, a clear bias in favour of 'the first love of the Revolution' taints its reliability. The author suggests that Kerensky was an irresistibly loveable person, limiting the level of analysis offered in the text.

Anin, D. (1967). The February Revolution: Was the Collapse Inevitable? *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 18, Taylor & Francis, Ltd: Didcot. pp. 435-457.

Anin analyses whether the collapse of the Soviet monarchy was 'inevitable'. The concept of inevitability troubles historians. One will never know whether the Soviet monarchy would have collapsed if the First World War had not occurred. Thus, researching this topic borders of pointlessness. It is for this reason that the source's reliability is severely limited.

Ascher, A. (1953). The Kornilov Affair. *The Russian Review*, Vol. 12, Wiley: London. pp. 235-252.

Ascher addresses Kennan's handling of Kornilov's march on Petrograd. The author asserts that Kerensky made an error in judgement in not preventing the march in the first place. The source's reliability rests in the fact that it does not offer any obvious bias in favour of or against Kerensky.

Asher, H. (1970). The Kornilov Affair: A Reinterpretation. *The Russian Review*, Vol. 29, Wiley: London. pp. 286-300.

Asher's reinterpretation of the Kornilov Affair further addresses Kerensky's inept leadership of the crisis. The text's usefulness is, however, limited as it fails to consider outside factors, such as pressure from Allies, which influenced Kerensky's decision to keep Russia in the war.

Biskupski, M. (1985). The Poles, the Root Mission, and the Russian Provisional Government, 1917. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 63, The Modern Humanities Research Association and University College: London. pp. 56-68.

Biskupski explores the failures of the Provisional Government, which led to its demise. The source argues that Lvov's inability to win over progressives and conservatives left Kerensky a 'poisoned chalice' when he became Prime Minister. Thus, the text is useful as it looks beyond Kerensky's time in power when forming its assessment of the figure.

British Library, (2017). Alexander Kerensky. [online] bl.uk. Available at: <https://www.bl.uk/people/alexander-kerensky#> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

This source looks at the embarrassment that was Kerensky fleeing Russia in the back of a car owned by the American Embassy. The British Library is a highly reputable source, recognised around the world for its various collections from numerous countries, including Australia and the United States.

Browder, R. (1970). Alexander Fedorovich Kerensky: 1881-1970. *The Russian Review*, Vol. 29, Wiley: London. pp. 484-487.

Browder offers a biographical summation of Kerensky's achievements. Although the source recounts of all Kerensky's life, by the same token the text is fairly shallow as evidenced through its four-page length. Therefore, the source is limited by its over-ambition.

Christian, D. (1994). Power and Privilege: The Russian Empire, The Soviet Union and the Challenge of Modernity. Palgrave USA: New York.

Christian asserts that social inequality plagued Russia under Kerensky's Prime Ministership. The text explores the lived experience of various social groups (proletariat, bourgeoisie, peasants and the intelligentsia) making it useful. Thus, the text is both a useful and reliable research tool.

Dalgliesh, W. (1962). Review of The Russian Provisional Government 1917: Documents by Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky. *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 15, University of Utah: Salt Lake City. pp. 540-541.

Dalgliesh analyses a variety of sources both written about and by Kerensky. A plethora of supporting evidence, including references to Kerensky's 'The Catastrophe', reaffirms its reliability. Thus, the source is a highly reliable and useful.

Elkin, B. (1964). The Kerensky Government and Its Fate. *Slavic Review*, Vol. 23, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. pp. 717-736.

Elkin argues that Kerensky was so unpopular at the time of the October Revolution, due to his failure to take Russia out of war, that the Red Guards faced little resistance upon storming the palace. As for reliability, the text shows no apparent bias against Kerensky, suggesting it is a reliable source.

Feldman, R. (1968). The Russian General Staff and the June 1917 Offensive. *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 19, Taylor & Francis, Ltd: Didcot. pp. 526-543.

Feldman lays blame for the failed June Offensive at the feet of Kerensky, who Feldman argues went through with the plan despite knowing it was unlikely to bare a major military breakthrough. The text is limited as it fails to look beyond Kerensky's influence as Minister of War, disregarding Lvov's role as Prime Minister.

Fielding, M and Morcombe, M. (1998). The Spirit of Change: Russia in Revolution. McGraw-Hill Education: Sydney.

This source suggests that two factors - a disorganised reallocation of land and the deeply unpopular war effort - caused the Provisional Government's downfall. The text does not reflect any clear bias, thus making it reliable.

Figes, O. (1988). Review of Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution by Richard Abraham. *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 31, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. pp. 493-499.

Figes analyses Kerensky's early political career, especially his election to the Fourth State Duma in 1912. Indeed, the source asserts that Kerensky's popularity saw him enter politics as "the toast of the people". The text is reliable as it does not make outrageous claims nor rely on speculation.

Gill G. (1978). The Failure of Rural Policy in Russia, February-October 1917. *Slavic Review*, Vol. 37, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. pp. 241-258.

Gill argues that the failure of Kerensky to manage expectations of progressives when it came to rural land policy damaged his reputation. The text is helpful as it explores the failure of the Land Commission to offer substantive policy change. Thus, the source is a useful research tool.

Hughes, M. (2017). *The legacy of Alexander Kerensky, Russia's last leader before the Bolshevik revolution*. [online] independent.co.uk. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/long_reads/alexander-kerensky-russia-bolshevik-revolution-interview-1917-centenary-a8036256.html [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

Hughes looks at Kerensky's legacy on contemporary Russian society. The source interviews Kerensky's grandson, Stephen Kerensky, whom vehemently defends his grandfathers in light of modern criticism in relation to the downfall of Russian democracy. The author does not offer a viewpoint in favour of or against Kerensky, making him reliable.

Kerensky, A. (1927). The Catastrophe. D. Appleton and Company: New York.

Written while in exile, Kerensky recounts his eye witness account of the February Revolution. The source is extremely useful as it offers a personal insight into the experiences of a leading figure at the time. An obvious bias in favour of the Revolution limits the source's reliability, but this does not weaken its usefulness.

Kerensky, A. (1932). The Policy of the Provisional Government of 1917. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 11, The Modern Humanities Research Association and University College. London. pp. 1-19.

Kerensky attempts to justify his decisions as Prime Minister in 'The Policy of the Provisional Government of 1917'. He attributes attacks from monarchists, such as Kornilov, as the main reason for the Provisional Government's demise. The text is biased in favour of Kerensky, blaming Kornilov and the Allies for his handling of the Kornilov Affair, which taints its reliability.

Kolonitskii, B and Cohen, Y. (2009). Russian Historiography of the 1917 Revolution: New Challenges to Old Paradigms? *History and Memory*, Vol. 21, Indiana University Press: Bloomington. pp. 34-59.

Kolonitskii and Cohen analyse different interpretations, such as monarchist and Bolshevik, of the Revolutions of 1917. The source is useful as it synthesises a variety of viewpoints but is somewhat limited as it fails to reach a coherent conclusion.

Llewellyn, J, Rae, J and Thompson, S. (2014). *Alexander Kerensky*. [online] alphahistory.com. Available at: <https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/alexander-kerensky/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

This source caters toward both a highly educated and amateur audience. The text refrains from offering personal opinions of Kennan's life, but rather it sticks to facts. It is for this reason that the source though lacking in critical analysis is still useful.

Llewellyn, J, Rae, J and Thompson, S. (2014). *The Provisional Government*. [online] alphahistory.com. Available at: <https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/provisional-government/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

Llewellyn and Thompson address the short-lived tenor of the Provisional Government. The pair recount the Prime Ministership of Lvov and Kerensky, again refraining from offer personal judgement on either of the two leaders.

Llewellyn, J, Rae, J and Thompson, S. (2014). *Russian Revolution Quotations*. [online] alphahistory.com. Available at: <https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/russian-revolution-quotations/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

This source is useful as it contains a variety of quotes from key figures during the time of Russia's Revolutions, such as Kerensky, Stalin and Trotsky. Since the text merely recounts the quotes, there is no obvious bias, thus making it reliable.

Lynch, M. (1986). *Reaction and Revolution: Russia 1894-1924* Third Edition. Holder Murray: London.

Lynch offers the July Days as a pivotal moment in which Kerensky attacked the Bolsheviks through propaganda, namely speeches, but failed to eliminate the threat. The source is useful as it proposes Lenin's staged his political revival based on the issues of bread, peace and land. The inclusion of primary evidence, including Lenin's April Theses, reaffirms its reliability.

Masis, J. (2017). *Before the Bolsheviks, this man abolished Russia's Pale of Settlement*. [online] timesofisrael.com. Available at: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/before-the-bolsheviks-this-man-abolished-russias-pale-of-settlement/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

Masis explores Kerensky's achievements as a defence lawyer, specifically his defence of Mendel Beilis; a Jewish man accused of ritual murder. Although the text presents a pro-Jewish bias, lauding the establishment of Jewish rights in Russia, this allows one to understand what life was like for the ethnic group at the time of 1917. Therefore, the text is somewhat reliable but highly insightful as it depicts Kerensky's influence on Jewish culture.

McKean, R. (1989). Review of Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution by Richard Abraham. *The English Historical Review*, Vol. 104, Oxford University Press: Oxford. pp. 147-149.

This source reviews Richard Abraham's biography of Kerensky, suggesting that the biography is overly supportive of Kerensky. McKean appears biased against Kerensky as he is overly eager to highlight Kerensky's mistakes, such as his mishandling of land reform.

Mosse, W. (1964). Interlude: The Russian Provisional Government 1917. *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 15, Taylor & Francis: Didcot. pp. 408-419.

This article argues that Prime Minister Lvov and Kerensky had the opportunity during early-to-mid 1917 to prevent another Revolution through taking Russia out of the First World War. The source is limited as it fails to consider outside pressures from the Allies, which contributed to Russia staying the in war.

Mosse, W. (1967). The February Regime: Prerequisites of Success. *Soviet Studies*, Vol. 19, Taylor & Francis, Ltd: Didcot. pp. 100-108.

Mosse asserts that Russia's failing war effort served as the catalyst for the February Revolution. The source is reliable insofar as it does not critique individuals' personalities, such as Rasputin or Tsar Nicholas, rather their decisions at the time.

Newton, D. (1989). Review of Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution by Richard Abraham. *New Zealand Slavonic Journal*, Australia and New Zealand Slavists' Association: Sydney. pp. 212-218.

This source also reviews Richard Abraham's biography of Kerensky. Newton praises the depth of Abraham's research, especially in relation to Kerensky's time as a lawyer and his work the Jewish community. This text is useful as it is succinct and easy to follow.

O'Connor, T. (1992). Review of Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution by Richard Abraham. *Canadian Slavonic Papers*, Vol. 34, Taylor & Francis Ltd: Didcot. pp. 320-221.

This source is yet another review of Richard Abraham's biography of Kerensky. The text is limited due to its short length, which appears intended for a casual audience. O'Connor testifies to the depth of information presented in Abraham's work, making the source useful.

Quiggin, J. (2017). *The February Revolution and Kerensky's Missed Opportunity*. [online] nytimes.com. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/opinion/the-february-revolution-and-kerenskys-missed-opportunity.html> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

This article from the New York Times highlights Kerensky's missed opportunity in not further pursuing the policy of land redistribution as Prime Minister. The opinion piece is, however, a reflection of the author's opinion and not based on a variety of evidence, diminishing its reliability. The source is still useful as it offers possible outcomes, including war and peace, of land policies if were to had Kerensky pursued them at the time.

Raleigh, D. (1988). Review of *Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution* by Richard Abraham. *Slavic Review*, Vol. 47, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. pp. 739-740.

Raleigh reviews 'Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution' by Richard Abraham. McNeal offers a flattering assessment of Abraham's work, specifically its extensive detail of Kerensky's entire life. This source is not limited by any obvious bias, making it reliable.

Reed, J. (2006). *Ten Days That Shook the World* (Value Edition). Dover Publishers: New York.

'Ten Days That Shook the World' is an insightful look at the experiences of John Reed, an American journalist in Russia at the time of the Russian Revolutions. Reed argues that Kerensky's unpopularity saw even the Cossacks, ardent anti-Bolsheviks, abandon him. It is for this reason that the source is useful.

Schlesinger, R. (1964). Review of *The Russian Provisional Government, 1917; Documents* by Robert Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky. *Science & Society*, Vol. 28, Guilford: New York. pp.305-315.

This source analyses a collection of governmental documents written by none other than Kerensky himself. Schlesinger credits Kerensky with introducing Russia into the idea of a liberal democracy but concedes that Kerensky was unable to win over enough hearts and minds, leading to his demise in October of 1917.

Simkin, J. (1997). *Alexander Kerensky*. [online] spartacus-educational.com. Available at: <https://spartacus-educational.com/RUSkerensky.htm> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

Spartacus Education is a balanced source as it does not argue in favour of or against Kerensky's leadership. Reference to primary sources, such as Kerensky's Memoirs, informs Simkins viewpoint on the historical figure. Thus, the source is credible and useful.

Strakhovsky, L. (1955). Was There a Kornilov Rebellion? A Re-Appraisal of the Evidence. *The Slavonic and European Review*, Vol. 33, the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College: London. pp. 372-395.

Strakhovsky's re-appraisal of the evidence surrounding the Kornilov Rebellion comes to the conclusion that the affair was a tragic case of miscommunication with Kornilov led to believe he held Kerensky's full support and the Prime Minister led to believe the opposite. The source is reliable as it offers numerous views on who is to blame for the affair, whether that be Kerensky, Kornilov or the intermediary Lvov.

Thatcher, I. (2015). Post-Soviet Russian Historians and the Russian Provisional Government of 1917. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, Vol. 93, The Modern Humanities Research Association and University College: London. pp. 315-337.

This source argues that Kerensky is equally revered and reviled within contemporary Russian society. The text is not overly critical, nor does it offer glowing praise, but rather takes a middle-of-the-road approach in analysing Kerensky. It is for this reason that the text is credible.

The Editors of Britannica, (2017). *Alexander Kerensky*. [online] Britannica.com. Available at: <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Aleksandr-Kerensky> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

Britannica offers an overview of Kerensky's early life and governmental career. The text is useful in its broadness, making it an ideal starting point for research. The source's shallow depth does, however, limit its usefulness.

Trueman, C. (2015). *The Provisional Government*. [online] historylearningsites.co.uk. Available at: <https://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/russia-1900-to-1939/the-provisional-government/> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

History Learning Site offers an incredibly shallow account of the Provisional Government. It does not offer any first hand evidence, relying solely on secondary sources, limiting its credibility and usefulness as a research tool.

Wade, R. (1989). Review of *Alexander Kerensky: The First Love of the Revolution* by Richard Abraham. *International Review of Social History*, Vol. 34, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. pp. 126-128.

Wade claims that Abraham's personal fondness of Kerensky causes Abraham's text to overlook Kerensky's inability to delegate responsibility. Instead, Wade claims Kerensky believed he alone could convince the Russian proletariat to support democracy. The source is fair in its criticism, making it useful.

Whitman, A. (1970). *Alexander Kerensky Dies Here at 89*. [online] nytimes.com. Available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/06/opinion/the-february-revolution-and-kerenskys-missed-opportunity.html> [Accessed 1 Apr. 2019].

Whitman indicates that history views Kerensky in a predominately negative light; conservatives blame him for the rise of communism, while communists cast him as a faux-revolutionary who merely hung around during the revolution. The article's 1970 publication date does not limit its usefulness as it includes details of Kerensky's trips to Australia which remain up-to-date.

Williams, H. (1991). The Socialist Revolutionary Party, Kerensky and the Kornilov Affair: from the unpublished papers of Harold W. Williams. *New Zealand Journal*, Australia and New Zealand Slavists' Association: Sydney. pp. 131-161.

Williams argues that it was Kerensky's inability to please the Socialist Revolutionary Party who wanted to leave the war, which facilitated his downfall. Williams fails to consider the pressure from Allied forces on Russia to remain in the war effort, limiting the source's credibility.